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Abstract—In this paper, we explore the effect of architecture
completeness on adversarial robustness. We train models with
different architectures on CIFAR-10 and MNIST dataset. For
each model, we vary different number of layers and different
number of nodes in the layer. For every architecture candi-
date, we use Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to generate
untargeted adversarial attacks and use adversarial training to
defend against those attacks. For each architecture candidate,
we report pre-attack, post-attack and post-defense accuracy for
the model as well as the architecture parameters and the impact
of completeness to the model accuracies.
Index Terms—adversarial attacks, neural network search,
adversarial defense, adversarial training, robustness search
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent machine learning breakthroughs help solve many
tasks including facial recognition [1], surveillance [2], natural
language processing tasks [3], materials discovery [4] and
bio-authentication systems [5]. Yet, existence of adversarial
attacks in deep learning models trouble many researchers since
mission-critical systems where these models are deployed
have very little room for errors which might be caused by
adversarial attacks [6] [7].
In this study, we are interested in exploring what steps we can
take to improve robustness from the defender’s point of view
as well as what steps we can take to adversarially attack a
model more efficiently from the attacker’s point of view. In
both attempts, our goal is to understand adversarial robustness
better and propose a framework to increase robustness.
The title of this study, “ATRAS”, is an acronym for ”Ad-
versarially Trained Robust Architecture Search”.
We use adversarial training to defend our deep learning
models since adversarial training is studied in the literature
and remains to be a strong defense at the time of the
writing of this paper [8] [9] [10] [7]. We investigate how
architecture size impacts amount of accuracy that is recovered
after adversarially training a model against attacks. Besides
adversarial training, we also investigate how architecture size
impacts transferability of adversarial attacks.
This research is organized so that section I introduces
All code is open-sourced on GitHub.
the concept of drowsy driving and section II explores what
has been done in this field. section III explains the dataset,
the models, adversarial attacks, adversarial training and
limitations that we use/have in this study. We report the
results in section IV and conclude the study in section V with
summarizing what we have done in this study and discussing
where the research might go in the future.
II. RELATED WORK
Adversarial attacks are inputs that look like the original im-
ages but with perturbations added to result in misclassifications
in the classifier [11] [12] [13] [14]. Adversarial attacks can be
created in the image domain [1] as well as audio domain [15].
Adversarial training is one way of defending against these
attacks since using adversarial attacks [16]. we can generate
adversarial samples and then use these samples in our training
to develop high accuracy models. Adversarial training as a
defense depends on model and task at hand significantly.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Adversarial Attacks
In this study, we only use FGSM because only FGSM out
of DeepFool and PGD runs reasonably fast on a commodity
computer to finish all the desired workloads.
1) Fast Gradient Sign: The fast gradient sign [17] method
optimizes for the L∞ distance metric and its advantage is fast
running tim, which comes at the expense of generating images
that are very similar to the original image.
Given an image x the fast gradient sign method sets
x′ = x− ε · sign(∇lossF,t(x)),
where ε is chosen to be sufficiently small so as to be
undetectable, and t is the target label. Intuitively, for each
pixel, the fast gradient sign method uses the gradient of
the loss function to determine in which direction the pixel’s
intensity should be changed (whether it should be increased























Fig. 1: Samples from CIFAR-10 dataset
Fig. 2: Samples from MNISt dataset.
B. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training [18] [19] [16] is the process where the
adversarially generated samples are included in the training
data in the hopes that the model will recognize the attacks
next time sees it. In the current literature, adversarial training
is one of the stronger defenses against adversarial attacks
especially if it is combined with other defenses [16] [20].
We adversarially train our MNIST and CIFAR-10 models
and report pre attack, post attack and post defense train and
test accuracies as it can be seen in Table II and Table I.
During our adversarial training, we can only use Fast Gradient
Sign Method due to its very fast execution compared to
other computationally expensive attacks such as DeepFool and
Projected Gradient Sign Method.
C. Dataset
In this study, we use CIFAR-10 and MNIST datasets.
D. Limitations
In this study, we examine many different combinations to
see the full effect of attacks and defenses. Due to numerous
workloads required to run in this research paper, we were
able to use only FGSM due to its fast execution. This
limited our research to only run FGSM as adversarial attack.
Another limitation that arised was the dataset. Running
many workloads over and over again required too much
computational resource so we were only able to use CIFAR-
10 and MNIST datasets and had to exclude ImageNet dataset.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND EVALUATION
We report all the results in Table I and Table II. In our
analysis, we need to consider two aspects of the attacks.
• How successful is the adversarial attack?
• How successful is the defense?
To answer these questions, we adversarially attack the
models before they are adversarially trained. Later, we use
adversarial training to train the models and defend them
against adversarial attacks. We then adversarially attack the
models after they are adversarially trained. The increase in
accuracies between these two rounds of attacks is important
because it tells us how much the model can recover (i.e the
accuracy is previously low due to attacks. Now, the model is
trained adversarially, how much accuracy can we recover?)
This ”recovery” measure is therefore important to answer how
successful the adversarial attack is as well as how successful
the defense is.
For MNIST, we see that adversarial training as a defense
is most effective on smaller architectures. Below, we report
differences between accuracies Table I, model candidates
with when attacked after adversarial training compared to
when attacked before adversarial training.
1) Models with one hidden layer average a 4.58% increase
2) Models with two hidden layers average 2.5% decrease
3) Models with three hidden layers average 4.06% increase
4) Models with any other larger architecture average 0.99%
increase
when attacked after adversarial training compared to when
attacked before adversarial training.
For CIFAR-10, we see that adversarial training as a
defense is most effective on smaller architectures. Below,
we report differences between accuracies Table I, model
candidates with when attacked after adversarial training
compared to when attacked before adversarial training.
1) Models with one hidden layer average a 35.2% increase
2) Models with two hidden layers average 44.5% decrease
3) Models with three hidden layers average 31.30% in-
crease
4) Models with any other larger architecture average 7.28%
increase
when attacked after adversarial training compared to when
attacked before adversarial training. For CIFAR-10, we also
report that post defense accuracy against adversarial attacks is
the largest among smaller networks (around 53% test accuracy
compared to 43.34% test accuracy)
We highlight the following observations before we conclude
the paper:
1) Models with smaller architectures take shorter to train
and therefore, become preferable for adversarial training
due to less time that they take.
2) Post defense accuracy when adversarially attacked is the
highest on models with smaller architectures ]
3) Most recovery is observed on models with smaller archi-
tectures (4.58% recovery increase in MNIST and 35.2%
recovery increase in CIFAR-10, both highest compared
to all other models)
We highlight again that from defender’s point of view,
both of these findings suggest that smaller networks are more
efficient to use since they have less parameters so it is faster to
adversarially train them and smaller networks can recover their
pre-attack accuracies almost all the time. From the attacker’s
point of view, smaller networks are a gateway to attack
larger networks since adversarial attacks on a smaller network
are also adversarial to larger networks due to transferability
principle.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, we attack models with different architecture
and report that the attacks on a smaller network are also
adversarial to larger networks. We use adversarial training
to defend against adversarial attacks and see that smaller
networks can recover more compared to larger networks. From
defender’s point of view, both of these findings suggest that
smaller networks are more efficient to use since they have less
parameters so it is faster to adversarially train them and smaller
networks can recover their pre-attack accuracies almost all the
time. From the attacker’s point of view, smaller networks are a
gateway to attack larger networks since adversarial attacks on
a smaller network are also adversarial to larger networks. A
future study might include whether the defenses on a smaller
network somehow transfer to larger networks.
TABLE I: FGSM attacks on MNIST. We report a base line training and test accuracy. We then generate adversarial attack
success rate before the defense. We then use adversarial training to defend our model against adversarial attacks and report
the accuracy when attacked after the defense
train acc test acc acc when attacked
before adv training
adversarial train acc adversarial test acc acc when attacked
after adv training
hidden layers
0.1126 0.1142 0.1142 0.1126 0.1142 0.1142 [8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024]
0.762 0.7274 0.6864 0.9886 0.959 0.9546 [16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024]
0.1126 0.1142 0.1142 0.1126 0.1142 0.1142 [24, 48, 96, 192, 384, 768]
0.98 0.9544 0.9238 0.9918 0.9644 0.9616 [32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024]
0.11 0.1024 0.1024 0.1126 0.1142 0.1142 [40, 80, 160, 320, 640]
0.1126 0.1142 0.1142 0.1126 0.1142 0.1142 [48, 96, 192, 384, 768]
0.1126 0.1142 0.1142 0.1126 0.1142 0.1142 [56, 112, 224, 448, 896]
0.8784 0.8416 0.727 0.9957 0.9674 0.9682 [64, 128, 256, 512, 1024]
0.992 0.9672 0.9418 0.9985 0.9732 0.9678 [8, 32, 128, 512]
0.9896 0.9682 0.9216 0.9995 0.9802 0.9786 [16, 64, 256, 1024]
0.9934 0.9698 0.9254 0.9992 0.9754 0.9754 [24, 96, 384]
0.9896 0.9586 0.9154 0.9993 0.9746 0.9742 [32, 128, 512]
0.9944 0.972 0.9462 0.9977 0.9714 0.9712 [40, 160, 640]
0.9968 0.9734 0.9506 0.9984 0.9772 0.9762 [48, 192, 768]
0.9954 0.9738 0.9426 0.9988 0.975 0.9776 [56, 224, 896]
0.9964 0.9728 0.938 0.9989 0.9788 0.9806 [64, 256, 1024]
0.995 0.9654 0.934 0.9994 0.9726 0.9712 [8, 64, 512]
0.9938 0.969 0.9278 0.9991 0.9778 0.9788 [16, 128, 1024]
0.9956 0.9688 0.9274 0.9994 0.9738 0.975 [24, 192]
0.9966 0.9678 0.9398 0.9997 0.9718 0.97 [32, 256]
0.9982 0.9706 0.948 1.0 0.9768 0.9758 [40, 320]
0.9954 0.9716 0.9446 0.9993 0.9736 0.9764 [48, 384]
0.9968 0.9704 0.9436 0.9998 0.9766 0.9758 [56, 448]
0.998 0.9726 0.9436 0.9998 0.973 0.9748 [64, 512]
0.996 0.972 0.9272 0.9998 0.9772 0.9714 [8, 128]
0.9946 0.9696 0.9246 0.9997 0.9778 0.9772 [16, 256]
0.9982 0.97 0.9416 0.9998 0.977 0.9718 [24, 384]
0.9976 0.9726 0.9358 0.9983 0.964 0.9704 [32, 512]
0.9976 0.9704 0.9440 0.9996 0.9716 0.9734 [40, 640]
0.9974 0.9762 0.9494 0.9997 0.9722 0.9782 [48, 768]
0.9972 0.9684 0.9470 0.9999 0.9774 0.9762 [56, 896]
0.9956 0.9706 0.9374 0.9995 0.9744 0.976 [64, 1024]
0.9958 0.9678 0.9382 0.9992 0.9748 0.966 [8, 256]
0.9966 0.9686 0.9384 0.9993 0.9762 0.9764 [16, 512]
0.9978 0.9766 0.9472 0.9998 0.9742 0.9754 [24, 768]
0.9984 0.9742 0.9438 0.9998 0.9762 0.9778 [32, 1024]
0.9982 0.9606 0.9176 0.9999 0.9712 0.9704 [40]
0.9986 0.9658 0.9234 1.0 0.9714 0.9692 [48]
0.9984 0.9614 0.924 1.0 0.9688 0.9656 [56]
0.9988 0.9646 0.925 0.9999 0.9654 0.968 [64]
TABLE II: FGSM attacks on CIFAR10. We report a base line trainng and test accuracy. We then generate adversarial attack
success rate before the defense. We then use adversarial training to defend our model againsts adversarial attacks and report
the accuracy when attacked after the defense
train acc test acc acc when attacked
before adv training
adversarial train acc adversarial test acc acc when attacked
after adv training
hidden layers
0.1040 0.1008 0.1008 0.1038 0.0982 0.0982 [8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024]
0.1040 0.1008 0.1008 0.1040 0.1008 0.1008 [16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024]
0.1038 0.1024 0.1024 0.1040 0.1008 0.1008 [24, 48, 96, 192, 384, 768]
0.1038 0.1014 0.1014 0.1038 0.0982 0.0982 [32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024]
0.1038 0.1014 0.1014 0.1038 0.1014 0.1014 [40, 80, 160, 320, 640]
0.413 0.386 0.1742 0.8623 0.5614 0.5386 [48, 96, 192, 384, 768]
0.1038 0.0982 0.0982 0.1038 0.1024 0.1024 [56, 112, 224, 448, 896]
0.1038 0.1014 0.1014 0.1038 0.1014 0.1014 [64, 128, 256, 512, 1024]
0.3938 0.3862 0.1766 0.6851 0.5224 0.4938 [8, 32, 128, 512]
0.1038 0.0982 0.0982 0.6105 0.5172 0.5104 [16, 64, 256, 1024]
0.5694 0.4964 0.1772 0.9328 0.5720 0.541 [24, 96, 384]
0.5246 0.4826 0.1886 0.9277 0.5856 0.5524 [32, 128, 512]
0.5262 0.4820 0.1810 0.9365 0.5898 0.5606 [40, 160, 640]
0.1038 0.1024 0.1024 0.1040 0.1008 0.1008 [48, 192, 768]
0.568 0.4984 0.1794 0.9653 0.5932 0.56 [56, 224, 896]
0.535 0.4679 0.1939 0.9513 0.5748 0.5488 [64, 256, 1024]
0.4970 0.4542 0.1816 0.8340 0.524 0.4992 [8, 64, 512]
0.5364 0.4932 0.192 0.9446 0.5684 0.5444 [16, 128, 1024]
0.718 0.5482 0.1902 0.9936 0.5492 0.4954 [24, 192]
0.718 0.5498 0.1984 0.9887 0.5718 0.5326 [32, 256]
0.6968 0.5398 0.2034 0.9753 0.5674 0.528 [40, 320]
0.664 0.547 0.1752 0.9763 0.579 0.526 [48, 384]
0.659 0.5332 0.2022 0.9735 0.5682 0.5324 [56, 448]
0.7002 0.5608 0.1936 0.9745 0.5760 0.5326 [64, 512]
0.6676 0.5344 0.1624 0.9534 0.5372 0.4982 [8, 128]
0.6714 0.527 0.196 0.9679 0.562 0.5408 [16, 256]
0.6504 0.5464 0.185 0.9306 0.573 0.5124 [24, 384]
0.6522 0.5468 0.1924 0.9452 0.5764 0.529 [32, 512]
0.6954 0.5334 0.1992 0.9832 0.5816 0.5422 [40, 640]
0.7138 0.5589 0.1914 0.9888 0.5824 0.5328 [48, 768]
0.748 0.55399 0.2068 0.9955 0.5844 0.5446 [56, 896]
0.6774 0.5354 0.1898 0.983 0.5636 0.5308 [64, 1024]
0.6 0.5022 0.1746 0.9217 0.5466 0.4974 [8, 256]
0.6264 0.5158 0.1932 0.937 0.5692 0.5198 [16, 512]
0.6802 0.5574 0.1634 0.977 0.5714 0.516 [24, 768]
0.684 0.5542 0.196 0.9865 0.5728 0.539 [32, 1024]
0.8608 0.5726 0.1644 0.9958 0.5238 0.5258 [40]
0.9036 0.5596 0.189 0.9983 0.5314 0.521 [48]
0.9079 0.5564 0.184 0.9985 0.5486 0.5446 [56]
0.887 0.5666 0.179 0.9961 0.54 0.5328 [64]
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